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The crew launch vehicle is a new NASA launch vehicle design proposed by the Exploration 
Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) to provide reliable transportations of humans and cargo from 
the earth’s surface to low earth orbit (LEO).  ESAS was charged with the task of looking at the 
options for returning to the moon in support of the Vision for Space Exploration.  The ESAS 
results, announced in September 2005, favor the use of shuttle-derived launch vehicles for the 
goals of servicing the International Space Station after the retirement of the STS and supporting 
the proposed lunar exploration program.  The first launch vehicle to be developed is the Crew 
Launch Vehicle (CLV), which will be operational by 2012, and will be derived from a four-
segment Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) and an upper-stage powered by an expendable 
version of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME).  The CLV will be capable of sending 
approximately 60,000 lbs to LEO in the form of a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) as well as a 
Service Module (SM) to support the CEV.   
The purpose of this paper is to compare the published CLV numbers with those computed 
using the design methodology currently used in the Space System Design Laboratory (SSDL) at 
The Georgia Institute of Technology.  The disciplines used in the design include aerodynamics, 
configuration, propulsion design, trajectory, mass properties, cost, operations, reliability and 
safety.  Each of these disciplines was computed using a conceptual design tool similar to that used 
in industry.  These disciplines were then combined into an integrated design process and used to 
minimize the gross weight of the CLV.   The final performance, reliability, and cost information 
are then compared with the original ESAS results and the discrepancies are analyzed. Once the 
design process was completed, a parametric Excel based model is created from the point design.  
This model can be used to resize CLV for changing system metrics (such as payload) as well as 
changing technologies. 
Nomenclature 
CAD = computer aided design 
CER = cost estimating relationship            
CES = crew escape system 
CEV = crew exploration vehicle 
CLV = crew launch vehicle 
DDT&E = design, development, test, & evaluation 
DSM = design structure matrix 
ESAS =   Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
ETO = Earth to orbit 
GLOW = gross lift-off weight 
Isp = specific impulse, sec 
KSC = Kennedy space center 
LCC = life cycle cost 
LEO =   low earth orbit 
LH2 =   liquid hydrogen 
 
 
LOX = liquid oxygen 
MECO = main engine cutoff 
MER = mass estimating relationship 
MR = mass ratio (gross weight / burnout weight) 
RSRB =   reusable solid rocket booster 
SSME =   space shuttle main engine 
STS =   space transportation system 
TFU = theoretical first unit 
I. Introduction 
he crew launch vehicle is a new NASA launch vehicle design proposed by the Exploration Systems Architecture 
Study (ESAS) to provide reliable transportations of humans and cargo from the earth’s surface to low earth orbit 
(LEO).   The ESAS results, announced in September 2005, favor the use of shuttle-derived launch vehicles for the 
goals of servicing the International Space Station after the retirement of the STS and supporting the proposed lunar 
exploration program. The CLV is a space shuttle derived launch vehicle.  The CLV uses shuttle heritage components 
such as the reusable solid rocket booster (RSRB) and the space shuttle main engine (SSME) to both reduce overall 
development costs as well as take advantage of the significant effort already spent on increasing the reliability of the 
shuttle components.  The focus on this paper will be the design of the launch vehicle itself including a crew escape 
system.  The crew exploration vehicle and the service module are treated as payload for the CLV and therefore only 
their weights are considered in this design.  
 The CLV design is a two stage shuttle derived launch vehicle.  The first stage consists of a space shuttle derived 
RSRB.  The second stage is a new stage designed around a single SSME.  The second stage will consist of a single 
LOX tank and a single LH2 tank constructed of Aluminum.  The payload of this vehicle is a capsule-style CEV with 
a supporting service module.  The total weight of this payload is approximately 59,900 lbs and it is injected into a 30 
X 100 nmi orbit at 60 nmi.  The CLV is also designed to improve the reliability of human launch beyond that of the 
space shuttle.  This is accomplished by utilizing the flight proven elements of the shuttle system, and eliminating the 
potential problems now plaguing the shuttle fleet.  This includes eliminating the potential for damage to the reentry 
heat shield by placing the CEV at the top of the launch vehicle and keeping the thermal protection system shielded 
through the ascent.  The crew escape system further decreases the probability of a loss of crew event.  The resulting 
overall reliability of the system is 0.9988 or 1.19 failures per 1000 flights.   
 The purpose of this paper is to compare the published CLV numbers with those computed using the design 
methodology currently used in the Space System Design Laboratory (SSDL) at The Georgia Institute of 
Technology.  This multi-disciplinary conceptual design process is used to create the CLV design.  This design 
process was completed using a disciplinary design tool for each of the following disciplines: external configuration 
and CAD was completed using ProEngineer, aerodynamic analysis was conducted with APAS1,  trajectory 
optimization used POST2, mass estimation and sizing was completed using mass estimating relationships3 (MERs), 
Cost estimating was conducted using NAFCOM4 cost estimating relationships (CERs),  and reliability was 
completed using Relex5.  Each of these tools was used to analyze their respective disciplines and was iterated to 
close the CLV design. 
 
II. Crew Launch Vehicle Configuration 
 
The crew launch vehicle is a two stage launch vehicle designed to transport the CEV and service module to low 
earth orbit.  The CLV design utilizes propulsion elements from the current space shuttle.  The first stage is a 
reusable solid rocket booster.  This RSRB is the same as the current shuttle solid boosters.  The second stage is 
propelled by one SSME.  An SSME was chosen to give the desired thrust to weight (~0.86) on the upper stage, 
while still providing the efficiency (Isp = 452.1) of a staged combustion LOX/LH2 engine.  The SSME design will 
be modified to start at altitude as well as simplified to limit production costs.  These simplifications are thought to 




The CLV is designed to carry a payload of 
approximately 59,900 lbs into a 30 X 100 nmi orbit 
injected at 60 nmi.  This payload weight was chosen 
as a result of the ESAS study for the CEV and service 
module design.  This orbit will allow the CEV to 
rendezvous with the prelaunched Earth departure stage 
and lunar lander in LEO and continue on to the Moon.  
The resulting vehicle is 309 ft tall and weights 1.840 
million pounds. 
In the design of the CLV reliability and safety are 
the main concerns.  The CLV is designed to provide 
reliability 10X greater than that of shuttle.  This is 
accomplished by taking reliable shuttle components 
and eliminating the fault paths discovered in the 
shuttle program.  The main differences between the 
shuttle and the CLV are that the CLV is a completely 
inline system.  This system eliminated the possibility of ejected pieces from contacting the vital crewed 
compartment of the vehicle.  This eliminates the possibility of insulation damaging the heat shield.  The CLV also 
uses the RSRB on the first stage.  This is a highly reliable rocket motor with over 200 successful flights with only 
one failure.  This failure was extensively investigated and resulted in a redesign of the RSRB.  The final addition to 
the CLV to improve safety is the addition of the crew escape system.  This system consists of a solid motor placed 
on top of the CEV.  This system will engage if a failure occurs in either stage of the vehicle.  It is assumed that if a 
failure in the launch vehicle occurs the CES has a 90% chance of separating the CEV from the CLV and safely 
recovering the crew.  The resulting calculated reliability of the CLV is 0.9988, which is at least 10X better than the 
demonstrated shuttle reliability. 
As Figure 2 shows the CLV is comparable with other previously existing expendable launch vehicles.  The CLV 
is very similar in overall gross mass with the Titan IV launch vehicle.  It is significantly taller than the Titan IV due 
to the large LOX/LH2 upperstage.  The CLV is significantly smaller than the Saturn V in overall height and only a 
third of the weight.  This is due to the limited payload capacity of the CLV (The CLV only launches the capsule and 





Figure 2. Comparison of CLV with other Expendable Launch Vehicles. 
 
Figure 1. CLV Configuration. 
 
 
III. Multidisciplinary Design Process 
 
The conceptual design methodology used in the design of the CLV combined analyses from several different 
disciplines.  A different tool was used for each disciplinary analysis, as shown in Table 2.  Each tool acts as a 
contributing analysis to the overall design of the vehicle.  In some cases, iteration between two or more analysis 
tools is required.  This coupling can be best visualized as a Design Structure Matrix (DSM) or “N-squared” diagram.  
Each box along the diagonal represents a contributing analysis, and the lines represent the flow of information.  
Information that is fed-forward through the design process is represented by lines on the upper right of diagonal, 
while the lines in the lower left are feed-back.   
The DSM for the CLV design is shown in Figure 3.  The feedback between the Trajectory analysis and the 
Weights & Sizing analysis closes the performance and configuration of the launch vehicle. The feedback between 




IV. Crew Launch Vehicle Closure Results 
 
Each of the design disciplines depicted in Figure 3 and Table 1 
are explained below in this section.  Each of these design disciplines 
were iterated and closed to get the final CLV design.  In designing 
and closing the CLV, there were constraints that had to be taken 
into account.  As a human-rated launch vehicle it is important that 
the maximum dynamic pressure (or “max-q”) remain low in order 
to enable crew escape.  It was desired to have a max-q below 740 
psf, which was that experienced by the Saturn V rocket6.  The CLV 
was closed at a max-q of 700 psf, below that of the Saturn V.  
However, in order to study what would be required to further reduce 
the loads on the crew during a crew escape event, certain changes 
were made to the SRB thrust profile that allowed a maximum 
dynamic pressure of 600 psf to be obtained.  Results from both 
designs are presented in the following sections. 
 
 
A. Internal Configuration and Layout 
As noted previously the CLV consists of two flight elements.  The first stage is the four segments solid rocket 
booster from the shuttle program.  The second stage is a new LOX/LH2 stage that is 124 feet tall and has the same 
diameter (18.04 feet, 5.5 meters) as the CEV.  This second stage provides a significant portion of the ∆V 
requirement (74%) to get to LEO.  A summary of the individual components follows as Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
 
Table 1. CLV Design Tools. 
 
Discipline Analysis Tool 
Configuration Pro/E 
Aerodynamics APAS (HABP) 
Trajectory POST 3-D 













Figure 3. DSM for CLV Design. 
 





B. Propulsion Design 
The CLV utilizes two shuttle-derived propulsion systems that both have high demonstrated reliability over the 
more than two decades of shuttle operation.  The first is the Shuttle 4-Segment Solid Rocket Booster, which 
functions as the sole booster stage of the CLV.  During the initial design process, an off-the-shelf 4-segment SRB 
was used, which has the same performance and thrust profile as the current Shuttle SRBs.  However, during design 
space exploration, it was found that due to the high thrust levels through the lower (and therefore denser) parts of the 
atmosphere, the vehicle design did not close for a max-q less than 700 pounds per square foot.  In order to reduce 
the acceleration experienced by the crew during an abort, it may be desirable to reduce the max-q to 600 psf.  When 
this constraint was added to the trajectory optimization code used in the CLV analysis, the trajectory code and 
weights and sizing tools did not converge to a closed vehicle design.   
The dynamic pressure versus time plot for the closed vehicle trajectory with a max-q of 700 psf is shown in 
Figure 7.  Also shown on the same plot is the thrust profile of the SRB.  The max-q occurs at around 50 seconds, 
about the time that the thrust reduces to about 2.4 million pounds (point 1).  One way of reducing the max-q further 
would be to reduce the vehicle thrust even further at this point in the trajectory.  This could be accomplished by 
tailoring the grain of the propellant.  However, it was desired to keep the total impulse provided by the SRB 
constant.  This is accomplished by increasing the thrust at point 2, while keeping the area under the curve equal to 
that of the original thrust profile.   
 
 
Figure 7. Dynamic Pressure (Max q limited to 700psf) with original SRB Thrust Profile. 
 
 
Figure 5. 1st Stage Configuration RSRB. 
 
 
Figure 6. 2nd Stage Configuration (SSME). 
 
 
The resulting trajectory is shown in Figure 8.  With the new thrust profile, the trajectory and sizing analyses were 
easily able to converge to a closed vehicle design.   
 
 
The upper stage propulsion of the CLV is assumed to be a single Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), 
manufactured by Boeing-Rocketdyne.  The SSME is staged-combustion engine that runs on liquid oxygen and 
liquid hydrogen propellants.  It has performed very reliably on ever Space Shuttle mission.  The SSME used on the 
Space Shuttle, however, is started using equipment on the launch pad.  In order to start the SSME at altitude, 
modifications must be made to its hardware which adds to the development cost of the propulsion system of the 
CLV.  Other than the air-start capability, however, the same performance characteristics as the current SSME Block 
II were assumed (Figure 9). 
C. Performance 
The trajectory of the CLV is optimized using POST 3-D2.  The simulated trajectory was required to deliver 
approximately 30 tons to a 30 x 100 nmi transfer orbit, using a SRB booster stage and SSME powered upper stage.   
The CLV trajectory is optimized to minimize the gross weight of the CLV by changing the pitch angles during 
the ascent.  The constraints on the trajectory are: the final orbit, the g forces for the ascent must not be greater than 4 
Figure 8. Dynamic Pressure (Max q limited to 600psf) with modified SRB Thrust Profile. 
• 4-segment Solid Rocket Booster  
• Propellant: PBAN
• Useable Propellant: 1,108 klb
• Burnout Weight:  180 klb
• Max Thrust:  3,300 klb (Vacuum)
• Isp:  268 s (Vacuum)  
 
http://www.space.com/imageoftheday/image_of_day_031118.html 
Figure 10.  RSRB Performance Characteristics. 
• Staged-Combustion Cycle
• LOX/LH2 Propellants
• Thrust: 469,000 lb (Vacuum)
• Isp: 452.1 s (Vacuum)
• Weight:  7000 lb
• Exit Area:  120 sq. ft
• Expansion Area: 69
• Chamber Pressure: 3000 psi
http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/propul/SSME.html 
Figure 9. SSME Performance Characteristics. 
 
 
g’s, the maximum dynamic pressure, and the final payload must be 30 tons.  The staging point was not changed, due 
to the fixed burn time of the SRB first stage. 
The trajectory plots for the two closed CLV designs are shown in Figures 11-14. 
 
 
The differences between the two trajectories can be seen in the acceleration experienced by the CEV Occupants 
on the two different vehicles.  The second peak in acceleration is higher on the 600 psf vehicle, because that 





Note the difference between the two is only in the upper stage.  This is because achieving the lower max-q involves 
“lofting” the trajectory, which causes the upper stage to take on more of the burden of achieving orbital velocity. 
 
Table 2. 700 psf CLV Propellant Breakdown. 
 
Fuel Value 
First Stage PBAN 1,108 klb
Second Stage LOX 361 klb
Second Stage LH2 60 klb
 
 
Table 3. 600 psf CLV Propellant Breakdown. 
 
Fuel Value 
First Stage PBAN 1,108 klb
Second Stage LOX 368 klb
Second Stage LH2 61 klb
Figure 11. Altitude and Velocity versus Time with 
original SRB Thrust Profile. 
 
Figure 12. Axial Acceleration Sensed by CEV with 
original SRB Thrust Profile. 
 
Figure 13. Altitude and Velocity versus Time 
with modified SRB Thrust Profile. 
 
Figure 14. Axial Acceleration Sensed by CEV with 
modified SRB Thrust Profile. 
 
 
D. Mass Estimation & Structural Design 
Mass estimation followed two methodologies.  For previously designed elements, such as the booster stage and 
the upper stage rocket engine, historical masses have been used.  The masses of elements of the CLV that will be 
newly developed, such as the upper stage tanks, interstage adapter, thrust structure, and vehicle subsystems are 
estimated using MERs3. 
Each subsystem and structural element has a unique MER based on regression of historical data.  Tank MERs, 
for example, are based on the volume of the tanks, the type of propellant being stored inside, and the pressure of the 
tank.  
As each run of POST 3-D is performed, the weights & sizing spreadsheet is updated to match the propellant 
required to achieve the trajectory.  As the propellant weight changes, the CLV tank and structure is appropriately 
resized, and therefore the dry weight changes.  The new dry weights are then inputted into POST 3-D, and the 
analysis rerun.  As this iteration continues, the vehicle design will converge to a closed design.  A summary of the 
closed weights for the 600 and 700 psf closed vehicles are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
The gross weight for both vehicle designs is around 1.8 million pounds.  This is slightly heavier than the Delta 
IV Heavy, which has a gross weight of 1.6 million pounds, and a smaller payload to LEO.  It should be noted that 
while the gross weight increased for the second closed vehicle design, the increase in dry weight was less than 300 
lb.  Most of the extra mass is extra propellant required to fly the more lofted trajectory.  
 
E. Reliability 
 The reliability for the CLV is calculated using the software RELEX7.  Among other capabilities, RELEX can 
create and calculate a fault tree analysis like the one shown below for the CLV.  For this analysis, it was assumed 
that Loss of Vehicle (LOV) and Loss of Crew (LOC) were the same.  No distinction is made between the 600 psf 
CLV and the 700 psf CLV because the only differences are in configuration and weight; the failure modes are 
assumed to be the same.  The majority of the input numbers were taken from a Futron study on launch vehicle 
reliability10.  The SSME reliability is referenced from the Boeing Co8.  There have been no assumptions regarding 
increases in reliability; all of the numbers used are traced from demonstrated systems.  This heritage uses older 
technology, and thus it could be reasonable to assume that this is a conservative estimate of CLV reliability.  Finally, 
even though the SRB first stage has a demonstrated failure rate of lower than 0.004, the authors of this paper 
decided to continue with a conservative analysis and calculate the reliability with a full bottoms-up approach.  The 
fault tree is illustrated in Figure 15. 
Table 5. CLV (max-q = 600 psf) Mass Summary. 
 
Weight Breakdown Structure Mass 
Booster Dry Weight 180 klb
Booster Propellant 1,108 klb
Interstage Adapter 5.5 klb
Booster Gross Weight 1,294 klb
Upper Stage Structure 25 klb
Upper Stage Subsystems 2.2 klb
Upper Stage Propulsion 8.7 klb
Growth Margin 6.3 klb
Dry Weight 42 klb
Reserves and Residuals 4.2 klb
CEV 60 klb
Crew Escape 9.3 klb
Propellant 429 klb
Upper Stage Gross Weight 547 klb
CLV Gross Weight 1,840 klb
 
Table 4. CLV (max-q = 700 psf) Mass Summary. 
 
Weight Breakdown Structure Mass 
Booster Dry Weight 180 klb
Booster Propellant 1,108 klb
Interstage Adapter 5.5 klb
Booster Gross Weight 1,294 klb
Upper Stage Structure 25 klb
Upper Stage Subsystems 2.2 klb
Upper Stage Propulsion 8.7 klb
Growth Margin 6.3 klb
Dry Weight 42 klb
Reserves and Residuals 4.2 klb
CEV 60 klb
Crew Escape 9.3 klb
Propellant 421 klb
Upper Stage Gross Weight 538 klb






The calculated reliability of the CLV is very high.  This can be attributed to two main factors.  First, on the 
SRB stage, the majority of the components are from well demonstrated solid rocket systems.  The lack of 
complexity when using solid rockets will typically manifest itself in reliability calculations.  This is one reason why 
solid boosters are chosen even though they lack the performance that can be achieved with a liquid rocket engine.  
This first stage also reflects the knowledge gained from the experience with the STS system and thus a high 
reliability is achieved. 
For the second stage, the SSME is expected to be the main driver for LOC.  Yet, its reliability is also very 
high due to its heritage.  This engine is one of the most extensively tested rocket engines, and thus an excellent 
failure rate is achieved.  The rest of the second stage inputs are determined from historical liquid rocket systems.  
With a typical driver of LOC having a high reliability, the whole system will then realize a high reliability.  Finally 
the addition of a crew escape system aids in ensuring a low LOC number.     
F. Operations 
 The operations costs for the CLV are calculated using estimates based on the STS program.  The entire first 
stage is an STS component, which makes this analysis appropriate.  In addition, the 2nd stage uses the SSME; this is 
another reason for why these estimates can be used.  However, because these components are derived from the STS 
program, they will inherit some of its cost structure.  The CEV component was not considered in these costs; 
therefore, additional costs for the turnaround of the CEV, along with its facilities are not included here.  Also, the 
cost of modifying facilities for the CLV are not included in these costs.  The lack of reliable data for which to base 
these estimates upon is the major reason that facility modifications are not included. 
 The variable cost per flight is estimated at $43.9M FY ’04.  The annual fixed costs for operations are estimated 
at $741.5M FY ’04.  These costs are driven from a derivation of shuttle hardware.  However, when comparing to the 
STS program, these costs are a fraction of what the fixed and variable costs used to be.  It is acknowledged that the 
CEV has not been included, nor has any impact of the future Heavy Lift Vehicle been estimated.  Yet, with the goal 
of sustained exploration, these operations costs help the CLV fit within initial budget estimates for achieving 
sustained access to space with these future systems. 
 
G. Cost & Economics 
 To estimate the rest of the costs for the CLV design, weight-based cost estimating relationships (CERs) were 
used.  The CERs were used to calculate an overall design, development, testing, and evaluation (DDT&E) cost.  
Initial production costs are also calculated.  Finally, with the use of a 90% learning curve, production costs based 
upon the number of flights is estimated.  These costs are then broken down by stage to see what the main cost 
drivers are.  The CERs are created from data in the NAFCOM4 model used in cost estimating.  An initial summary 
 
Figure 15. Fault Tree Analysis of CLV 
 
 
of the costs are listed in Table 6 (All costs are presented in $M FY 2004 dollars at an undiscounted rate).  The 
margin has already been built in to the costs and is included for more information. 
   
Table 6:  CLV DDT&E and TFU Costs ($M FY ’04) 




Total RSRM $647 $471








Total Upper Stage $2,699 $2,693
Margin (20%) $449 $446  
  
While the SRB has been used before, it was assumed that some DDT&E will be needed to prepare it to carry a 
new upper stage.  Additionally, the SRB will now have a different separation sequence, which will require some 
DDT&E before it can be flight qualified for human travel.  The 600 psf will require more DDT&E because that SRB 
will have to undergo a grain re-design.  The 700 psf case uses an off the shelf SRB; however, in order to achieve the 
lower dynamic pressure, the thrust profile of the SRB must be changed.  Hence, there is an increase in the DDT&E 
of the 600 psf vehicle.  The production costs are similar because the grain casting technique should be similar.  
However, there will be some increase in cost due to a different grain pour. 
 The second stage will require more development funding than the SRB first stage, due to the fact that it is a new 
second stage that must be qualified for human flight.  Additionally, the “air lighting” of an SSME will require a 
redesign and re-certification of this engine.  Since the SSMEs used on the CLV are expendable, many will be 
produced for this architecture, and the manufacturing techniques will also be changed.  Thus, there will be a learning 
process during this time which will give the SSME development a cost almost equivalent to a new engine 
development.  However, once this development has taken place, the production cost of the new SSME will be more 
in line with its original predecessor.  The slight differences between costs of the 600 psf CLV and the 700 psf CLV 
for the 2nd stage can be attributed to weight differences.  Since weight based CERs are being used, and these 
vehicles have slightly different masses, it is reasonable to expect slight differences in their 2nd stage costs.  However, 
since they are using the same “airlight” SSME, these costs will be the same. 
 The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) for the CLV is based upon a 15 year campaign and a flight rate as illustrated in 
Figure 16.  The calculation includes the DDT&E cost, plus the production costs (dependent upon flight rate), plus 
the annual fixed cost, plus the variable cost (also dependent upon flight rate).  Figure 17 shows the 600 psf case.  
Illustrated on the graph are both the total costs per flight along with the recurring costs per flight.  The two costs are 
very close; this is because the development cost spread over 15 years does not add greatly to the total cost per flight.  
The variable and fixed cost per year will easily eclipse the development costs for this vehicle when the total LCC is 




 The next figure shown is Figure 16, which is the 700 psf case.  The same trends exist as before:  the total cost per 
flight and the recurring cost per flight are very close.  Again this is because the development cost is small compared 
to the LCC contribution made by the annual fixed and variable costs.  The two launch vehicles are very close when 
compared for overall LCC.  The 600 psf vehicle will invariably cost more because it spends more on development 
for the new grain design.  Additionally, more is spent on production of the 600 psf vehicle.  Both are comparable in 
operations costs, thus the difference in development and production costs will account for the slight difference in 
total LCC.  However, both are very close. 
 The total costs of these vehicles are within projected budgets for exploration.  A flight rate of 2 per year will 
result in a cost of $783M FY ’04 for the 600 psf CLV and $773M FY ’04 for the 700 psf CLV.  With a doubling of 
flight rate, these costs can be moved into the $500M range.  However, this figure can be misleading because it 
incorporates the DDT&E costs; these costs will already have been paid for by the time of the first flight.  Therefore, 
with a cost of $684M and $680M FY ’04 for the 600 and 700 psf vehicles, respectively, the goal of achieving 
sustained exploration can be reached.   
V. Comparison with ESAS Results 
 It is now appropriate to compare the completed CLV design computed with the GT methodology to the 




As this table shows the GT results compare very closely with the NASA ESAS results.  The major difference 
was the weight of the second stage.  The GT results are indicative of flying a “lofted” profile to limit the maximum 
dynamic pressure.  This limit, as discussed above, was to limit the acceleration sensed by the astronauts on abort 
(the higher the max dynamic pressure, the larger the abort engines, and the higher the g’s on a low dynamic pressure 
abort).  The ESAS studies smaller mass could be a result of further tailoring of the ascent profile, or an introduction 
Table 7. Comparison of GT and ESAS Results. 
 
  GT NASA ESAS 
Gross Weight (inc. CEV and CES) 1,840,344 lb 1,775,385 lb 
First Stage   
 Dry mass 180,399 lb 180,399 lb 
 Gross mass 1,293,517 lb 1,292,655 lb 
 Height 133 ft 133 ft 
 Diameter 12 ft 12 ft 
Second Stage   
 Dry mass 42,084 lb 38,597 lb 
 Gross mass 477,629 lb 405,541 lb 
 Height 124 ft 105 ft 
 Diameter 18.04 ft 16.40 ft 
 
Figure 16:  CLV 700 psf Cost Per Flight ($M FY ’04), 
15 Year Campaign 
 
 
Figure 17:  CLV 600 psf Cost Per Flight ($M 
FY ’04), 15 Year Campaign 
 
 
of higher technology structures (i.e. Al-Li) to limit the structural weight of the second stage.  The resulting extra 
mass of the GT design still results in a feasible vehicle for the reference payload. 
VI. Conclusions 
 The CLV is a new NASA launch vehicle design proposed by the Exploration Systems Architecture Study 
(ESAS) to provide reliable transportations of humans and cargo from the earth’s surface to low earth orbit (LEO).   
The CLV uses shuttle heritage components such as the reusable solid rocket booster (RSRB) and the space shuttle 
main engine (SSME) to both reduce overall development costs as well as take advantage of the significant effort 
already spent on increasing the reliability of the shuttle components. The CLV design is a two stage shuttle derived 
launch vehicle.  The first stage consists of a space shuttle derived RSRB.  The second stage is a new stage designed 
around a single SSME.  The second stage will consist of a single LOX tank and a single LH2 tank constructed of 
Aluminum.  The payload of this vehicle is a 18 ft conical CEV with a supporting service module.  The total weight 
of this payload is approximately 59,900 lbs and it is injected into a 30 X 100 nmi orbit at 60 nmi.  The resulting 
CLV design is over 1.840 million pounds and stands 309 ft tall.  These results are just slightly larger then the 
reference ESAS design. 
 The CLV is also designed to improve the reliability of human launch beyond that of the space shuttle.  This is 
accomplished by utilizing the flight proven elements of the shuttle system, and eliminating the potential problems 
now plaguing the shuttle fleet.  This includes eliminating the potential for damage to the reentry heat shield by 
placing the CEV at the top of the launch vehicle and keeping the thermal protection system shielded through the 
ascent.  The crew escape system further decreases the probability of a loss of crew event.  The resulting overall 
reliability of the system is 0.9988 or 1.19 failures per 1000 flights.  This increases reliability over shuttle is achieved 
at a significant savings over the existing shuttle design.  The total costs of these vehicles are within projected 
budgets for exploration.  A flight rate of 2 per year will result in a cost of $783M FY ’04 for the 600 psf CLV.  With 
a doubling of flight rate, these costs can be moved into the $500M range.  However, this figure can be misleading 
because it incorporates the DDT&E costs; these costs will already have been paid for by the time of the first flight.  
Therefore, with a cost of $684M for the 600 psf CLV, the goal of achieving a sustainable exploration architecture 
can be reached.   
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Abstract 
Using NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate Spiral 3 requirements for human lunar 
surface exploration, a full concept architecture and Crew Transportation System vehicle design was 
performed using Apollo era architecture as the baseline. The analysis was executed using such systems 
engineering tools as Solid Edge, Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories (POST), Aerodynamic 
Preliminary Analysis System (APAS), NASA/Air Force Costing Model (NAFCOM), Technique for 
Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) and Space Propulsion Sizing Program 
(SPSP).  These systems engineering tools and techniques allowed the analysis to ensure a robust design 
that included atmospheric and space performance, system weights and geometries, safety and 
reliability, and life cycle costing.  Implementing these tools provided greater efficiency to create 
iterative design selections than Apollo era methodology, resulting in a final systems architecture 




APAS Aerodynamic Preliminary Analysis 
System 
AFRSI Advanced Flexible Reusable 
Surface Insulation  
CAD Computer Aided Design 
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle 
c.g. Center of Gravity 
CM Command Module 
CSM Command and Service Module 
CTS Crew Transportation System 
DDT&E Design, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation 
ECLSS Environmental Control and Life 
Support Systems 
EDS Earth Departure Stage 
EELV Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle 
EVA Extra Vehicular Activity 
FOM Figure of Merit 
Isp  Specific Impulse 
LEM Lunar Excursion Module 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
LLO Low Lunar Orbit 
LAM  Lunar Ascent Module 
LDM Lunar Descent Module   
LSAM Lunar Surface Access Module 
MADM Multi-Attribute Decision Making 
NAFCOM NASA/Air Force Costing Model 
PICA Phenolic Impregnated 
Carbonaceous Ablator 
PM Propulsion Module 
POST Program to Optimize Simulated 
Trajectories 
RCS Reaction Control System 
RM Re-entry Module 
RTG Radioisotope Thermal Generator 
SDLV Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle  
SPSP Space Propulsion Sizing Program 
TOPSIS Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to the Ideal Solution 
TEI Transearth Injection 
TLI  Translunar Injection 
TPS Thermal Protection System 
T/W Thrust to Weight 
∆V Change in Velocity
1 Introduction 
A conceptual design was obtained for a Crew 
Transportation System (CTS) intended to transport 
people safely from Earth to the moon and back. The 
procedure for design began with a validation of 
engineering tools for analysis of aerodynamics, 
trajectory performance, weights, propulsion, and cost 
using the Apollo Command, Service, and Lunar 
Exploration Modules as benchmarks.  Subsequently, 
the tools were used to size the Apollo architecture to 
meet a set of Spiral 3 requirements that are similar to 
those currently issued by NASA to industry. Today’s 
technologies, unavailable in the 1960’s, were 
analyzed in an effort to reduce the vehicle’s mass, 
decrease total cost, lessen risk, and improve safety. 
1.1 Tools Description 
 To accomplish a systems level design, the 
engineer must rely upon a variety of tools.  Each tool 
contributes to the accuracy and speed to which results 
can be produced. Though many engineering tools are 
available in the market today, there are several that 
contributed to the development of the CTS.  The 
historical data reference, Solid Edge, Space 
Propulsion Sizing Program, Aerodynamic 
Preliminary Analysis System, Program to Optimize 
Simulated Trajectories, NASA Air Force Costing 
Model, and the Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to the Ideal Solution, were the primary 
tools used. 
1.1.1 Historical Data 
 Historical data has been used in engineering 
analysis as long as the data has been generated to a 
sufficient degree of validation.  It provides the user 
with a solid understanding of the previous uses of 
certain technologies as well as a verification data-
point for new software tools.  In the 1950’s, 1960’s, 
and 1970’s, a tremendous amount of testing data and 
flight data was generated on America’s first conquest 
to the moon. Valuable historical data was later 
provided from the space shuttle, space stations, and 
various interplanetary missions by NASA.  Many 
tools today base their legitimacy upon historical data 
because they are valid data points and very difficult 
to simulate with sufficient accuracy. Such tools as 
NAFCOM (for costing) and SPSP (for systems 
sizing) actually draw on this data in their software 
processing.  Historical data can also provide the user 
with warnings that show less than desirable results, 
thus saving a project valuable time and money. One 
drawback to using historical data is that much of it 
was generated with different technology and different 
methodology.  For example, the main issue during 
Apollo was to develop new codes and manufacturing 
methods in a minimum amount of time, while today 
the issue is cost.  As long as the user is able to 
account for such differences, as is provided for in 
such tools like TOPSIS, historical data can be 
valuable data points.  
 Trajectory, power, mass, cost, and reliability 
information are a few of the areas where historical 
data is necessary to prove and sometimes develop a 
new tool.  For this project actual Apollo data was 
used frequently to provide a baseline for the CTS.  In 
a study performed by Reeves and Scher1, which 
explored the decisions made for Apollo, it was 
determined that the best decisions that could have 
been made, were indeed made by the Apollo 
engineers.  The system design baseline for this 
project was thus done so with confidence.   
1.1.2 Mass Sizing Tool 
 In designing a complex architecture, not all 
subsystems can be accounted for and sized.  
Simplifying assumptions to these components need to 
be made in order to move the design process along.  
For the design of architectures that are closely related 
to past vehicles, historical data of those past vehicles 
can be used as design points in sizing new 
architecture’s individual components.  The method 
used in sizing these components relate mostly to five 
fundamental unit comparisons, mass, distance, area, 
volume and time. 
 To describe how the mass sizing tool works, 
a certain amount of logic needs to be applied to the 
unit comparisons.  First, all the masses are already 
known for a chosen past vehicle design.  The 
assumption is then made that the new architecture 
will initially share all the same components as the 
past design, with other components added and 
removed as required.  The ratio of system increase in 
distance, area, volume, and time from the new design 
to the old design is taken, and multiplied by the mass 
to yield the new increase in mass.  This means that 
systems that only increase logically in one dimension 
(i.e.-length and time) are only increasing linearly, 
while systems that increase in two or three 
dimensions (i.e.-area and volume) are increasing in 
proportion to either the square or cube of the updated 
system.  From this, an effective mass sizing tool can 
be created.  For the CTS mass sizing tool, Microsoft 
Office Excel was used. This spread sheet 
incorporated the Apollo baseline as well as the 
various revisions that the CTS underwent.  
1.1.3 Solid Edge 
 As computers have progressed, so have their 
modeling capabilities.  Computer Aided Design 
(CAD) has become commonplace in modern 
engineering and most engineers have a basic 
understanding of the capabilities of a CAD software 
program.  The main premise of a CAD drawing is to 
give the customers and engineers an overall feel of 
the design in a drawn-to-scale representation of an 
actual design, and not an artist’s perspective.  A CAD 
design should be based off a minimum number of 
inputs in order to reduce drawing time and maximize 
results.   
 The CAD program chosen for this 
architecture is Solid Edge2.  When developing the 
CAD model, specific inputs had to be agreed upon 
that would drive the dimensions for the entire model.  
For the design of an entire vehicle, it was good 
practice to keep a master list of vehicle parameters.  
Microsoft® Office Excel provided a good medium for 
this kind of task.  With the Excel spreadsheet made 
readily available to all members of the team, each 
iteration of the design was easily recorded and 
exported for modeling in Solid Edge.  For the CTS, 
the driving factors in the Solid Edge model were the 
vehicle diameter and height.  When a design had 
been agreed upon, specific calculations would first 
take place in Excel for the simple geometry of the 
vehicle.  These calculations mostly involved tank 
configuration and habitable volume space, which 
were two major requirements.  These calculations are 
important because if the tanks were immediately 
modeled, it may be found that the tanks were too 
large for the current fairing configuration, and an 
excess amount of time would have been wasted on 
modeling an infeasible configuration.  Thus, in CAD 
modeling, it is always a good idea to set up an initial 
‘bare-bones’ calculation sheet that will determine the 
actual, geometric feasibility of the design.   
 Once a design has been agreed upon, CAD 
modeling can begin to take place.  Solid Edge does 
have the feature to make specific dimensions of the 
model reliant on inputs by calculating dimensions of 
the vehicle via user-defined equations.  If the primary 
vehicle design is not expected to change drastically 
over the course of the project, it is a good idea to 
input these equations from the start.  Often, these 
equations are the same equations used in the ‘bare-
bones’ geometric validation calculations of the 
design.  It should be noted that the majority of CAD 
software programs have this ability to build-in 
equations to the model being designed.  Furthermore, 
when designing the parts of a vehicle design, it is 
good practice to model and save all parts as separate 
files.  The user should never try to create the entire 
vehicle in one model drawing.  Once all parts of the 
vehicle have been modeled, assembly can take place.  
Assembling the vehicle is simple enough, but does 
take a certain amount of finesse that can only come 
from repetitive use of the program.  Once assembly is 
complete, the model is ready for export.   
 The advantage in using a CAD software tool 
is that it allows an overall perspective of the vehicle 
design.  Certain factors can be more easily 
recognized with a solid model.  Feasibility can be 
determined from common sense analysis of the shape 
of the design.  For the CTS, the CAD modeling 
allowed the designs to be compared, and improved 
over the initial designs.   
1.1.4 Space Propulsion Sizing 
Program 
 The Space Propulsion Sizing Program 
(SPSP)3 was developed at NASA Langley through 
Analytical Mechanics Associates, Inc. in order to 
obtain quick estimations in propulsion sizing for 
trade studies and spacecraft design.  SPSP produces 
results through a combination of mass estimating 
relationships, bottom-up calculations, and historical 
data to size several vehicle subsystems.  Microsoft® 
Office Excel and Visual BASIC are both utilized in 
this program and provide a user-friendly workspace.   
 SPSP performs mass sizing for the following 
systems: main engines, main tanks, propellant feed, 
reaction control, power, structures, and avionics.  
SPSP also provides geometry estimates based upon 
structure, main tanks, and main engines for the length 
and diameter of propellant tanks. Besides the 
numerical outputs of SPSP, Excel also provides a 
two-dimensional drawing of the vehicle.  SPSP also 
uses Visual Basic, and through the help of Pro-
Engineer, can provide detailed three-dimensional 
drawings.  Because of these output options the user 
can perform top level as well as detailed studies.  A 
visual understanding of the system rounds out the 
capabilities of SPSP.   
The inputs for the overall system in SPSP 
are payload mass, stage delta-v, propulsion envelope 
dimensions, upper limit g load, length of mission, 
number of stages, tank configuration, and maximum 
distance from the sun.  The outputs include mass 
breakdowns for the entire system as well as sizing of 
the system, g load, and duration of the engine burn.  
Additional inputs are required when trying to size a 
subsystem (e.g. power or engines). 
1.1.5 Aerodynamic Preliminary 
Analysis System 
APAS is the Aerodynamic Preliminary 
Analysis System4.  APAS was developed to provide a 
numerical approximation for aerodynamic 
coefficients in the subsonic, supersonic, and 
hypersonic flight regimes.  An interactive system 
allows input and analysis of geometry data in an 
output format similar to wind tunnel testing.  The real 
benefit of APAS is the ability to analyze an arbitrary 
design in the matter of hours while being able to 
retrieve a good preliminary concept of the 
performance characteristics.  Numerous different 
designs can thus be analyzed and exported for 
analysis allowing many different ideas in the design 
process to be considered. 
Two programs have been merged in APAS 
to cover all three flight regimes, Unified Distributed 
Panel (UDP) and Hypersonic Arbitrary Body 
Program (HABP).  For the purposes of this 
architecture, only hypersonic analysis is necessary 
because the CTS re-entry module is an Apollo based 
capsule that does not require highly maneuverable 
lifting body verification such as the Space Shuttle.  
Instead, conditions upon re-entry will be more 
valuable for purposes of heating and trajectory 
optimization.  It is thus prudent to realize that all 
assumptions and modeling for the CTS re-entry 
module will be based off the HABP program, and 
that modeling in the subsonic-supersonic regime with 
UDP is not necessary for a preliminary design effort 
that does not involve a maneuverable lifting body. 
HABP uses hypersonic analysis based on 
non-interfering, constant pressure, finite element 
analysis implemented on a body structure that is 
defined at the APAS command line.  This body 
structure is input as a surface of revolution about a 
central axis upon which center of gravity, angle of 
attack, etc. can be measured.  This revolved surface is 
broken down into a series of panels that is defined 
from the APAS command line.  The program then 
solves what may be characterized as a purely 
geometric problem.  The most common method, as 
well as the one used for this analysis, is the Modified 
Newtonian Flow method, which is a function of the 
element impact angle.  This angle is measured 
between the direction of flow and the plane of the 
panel that it is impacting.  From this angle, the local 
impact coefficient of pressure is calculated.  These 
pressures are integrated over the surface to compute 
lift, impact drag, and pitching moment.  In addition, 
the local viscous drag due to skin friction and the 
base drag are added to the impact drag to calculate 
the total drag. Base drag becomes negligible in the 
hypersonic regime because it is a function of the 
reciprocal of the square of the Mach number. 
The advantage of using APAS is the ability 
to obtain a good preliminary estimate to the flight 
characteristics of numerous different designs.  
Caution needs to be stressed though, that APAS is 
only an estimate to actual flight conditions and needs 
to be used only where appropriate.  For subsonic-
supersonic flight, UDP was found to inaccurately 
model actual flight characteristics for capsule-based 
shapes.  Thus, the user with minimal knowledge of 
APAS should not be critically concerned with such 
data as such analysis is not necessary for this type of 
architecture analysis. 
1.1.6 Program to Optimize 
Simulated Trajectories 
 POST is the Program to Optimize Simulated 
Trajectories5.  It was initially developed in 1970 as a 
Space Shuttle Trajectory Optimization program.  
Specifically, POST is a generalized point mass, 
discrete parameter targeting and optimization 
program.  It provides the capability to target and 
optimize point mass trajectories near an arbitrary 
rotating, oblate planet. The generality of the program 
is evidenced by its multiple event simulation 
capability which features generalized planet and 
vehicle models.  Using generalized routines, inputs, 
and outputs, POST is an excellent tool to simulate a 
wide variety of vehicle designs for atmospheric re-
entry. 
 In developing a POST simulation, various 
defaults of POST are very beneficial.  For example, 
POST keeps a very accurate database of Earth’s 
atmosphere and gravity field, allowing such matters 
to be bypassed for the simulation.  POST has 
acquired other databases for planets besides Earth 
that can be used if special care is taken to understand 
the properties defined for those planets.  This is the 
advantage of POST having such a generalized design, 
that planets can be used in the trajectory simulation at 
a minimum input effort.  This generalization does not 
extend to just planets though.  Other advantages are 
evident in POST.  The inputs do not always have to 
be in the same format.  POST can accept initial states 
of a spacecraft using Cartesian coordinates, Keplerian 
coordinates, latitude and longitude, or other common 
initial states.  This generality of different input types 
is also seen in the output.  POST will give various re-
entry parameters throughout the simulation for the 
user’s implicit understanding.  This includes location 
of the spacecraft in different coordinate systems, 
orientation of the spacecraft with respect to 
quaternions, inertial Euler angles, and much more 
information that will be more useful depending on 
the type of output most desired.  Overall, POST is a 
very powerful tool to use because of its generality in 
its routines, inputs, and outputs. 
 For this architecture, POST required a 
certain number of inputs, most notably mass, 
aerodynamic coefficients, initial state, and entry 
sequences.  The entry sequences relate specifically to 
the path taken through the atmosphere as understood 
from historical Apollo data that was described earlier.  
Note that for architecture design, pinpoint-landing 
location is not a primary concern to the user, thus the 
simulation is not required to reach landing, but only 
perhaps parachute deploy at a low Mach number.  
This will still allow the user to retrieve the important 
simulation data such as max g load, heat rate, and 
heat load.   
Although POST is a high fidelity simulation 
program, various fundamental concepts can be 
thought of before designing the re-entry simulation.  
There are fundamental equations for planar flight that 
will provide a better understanding of POST before 
using the program.  For example, the equation shown 
below gives an idea of how drag (D), mass (m), and 
flight path angle (γ) affect the change in velocity with 










From the above equation defined in Griffin6, one can 
understand that by only changing mass, g-load upon 
entry will either increase or decrease.  Increasing or 
reducing the total reference area for the re-entry 
vehicle can also change the drag term in turn 
affecting g-load as well.  G-load can be a driving 
factor in the design of a spacecraft.  This kind of 
simple understanding shows the ideal solution to such 
a problem, without having to go through the burden 
of optimizing g load with POST.   
The advantage of using POST is that flight 
data for such design points as heat shield sizing and g 
load can be obtained.  A user-friendly animation 
capability of POST is also beneficial to the user in 
helping to describe the re-entry dynamics and 
considerations.  The disadvantage to POST is the 
large learning curve for its use.  Users will find 
difficulty in understanding all the capabilities of 
POST.  If used properly though, POST provides a 
powerful tool in re-entry analysis and design.   
 
1.1.7 NASA Air Force Costing 
Model 
 The NASA Air Force Costing Model 
(NAFCOM) was developed by Space Applications 
International Corporation for NASA and the Air 
Force to develop a space-system costing model and is 
described in Ref. [7].  NAFCOM is based upon 
previous mission costs, with the primary driver for 
the costing model being mass and the secondary 
driver being technology development. NAFCOM is 
user-friendly, giving relative costing estimates that 
require little fore knowledge of previous space 
systems or costing analysis. When a more accurate 
costing model is desired, some knowledge of the 
present state of technology is necessary.   
 To begin creating a costing estimate in 
NAFCOM, a mission type is selected from the 
following options: manned launch vehicle, unmanned 
launch vehicle, Earth orbiting spacecraft, and 
planetary spacecraft.  For the purposes of this 
architecture, the manned launch vehicle option was 
selected.  The next step is selecting the vehicle type. 
For manned and unmanned launch vehicle options, 
the number of stages for the launch vehicle can be 
selected, or the vehicle can be shuttle derived. For 
Earth orbiting spacecraft, one of the following types 
must be selected: scientific, observatory, mapping, 
communication, reconnaissance, or positioning. For 
planetary spacecraft, inner planetary or outer 
planetary options are available with flyby or orbiter 
and probe as secondary selections. Finally, selections 
can be made of the type of engines needed, such as 
liquid or solid, and whether the vehicle should be 
designated ‘crew and cargo’ or just ‘crew’.  Once 
these options are selected, a vehicle template is 
generated by NAFCOM.  This template includes 
many subsystems such as thermal control, landing 
system, and environmental control and life support, 
which must be accounted for when creating a costing 
estimate. For each subsystem a weight is required to 
be input.  After the weight is chosen, the technology 
must be evaluated.  There are three slide bars that can 
be moved depending upon the level of advancement 
in technology.  The three bars are ‘manufacturing 
methods’, ‘engineering management’, and ‘new 
design’.  An example of how these bars might be 
implemented is when using a new design with 
undeveloped manufacturing methods, the ‘new 
design’ and ‘manufacturing methods’ bars are set to 
100. These bars not only affect the flight unit costs, 
but the development and production costs as well.  A 
useful feature of NAFCOM is that a data table with 
historical spacecraft information is shown near the 
bottom of the screen.  This allows the retrieval of 
various weights of spacecrafts without having to go 
look them up in other sources. When the various 
subsystems have been filled out to desired 
completion, a main screen displays four costing 
estimates. The first is Design, Development and 
Testing costs. The second is production costs of the 
total number of spacecrafts.  The third is a single 
flight unit cost and the fourth is the total mission cost.  
1.1.8 Technique for Order 
Preference by Similarity to 
the Ideal Solution 
 The Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) is a tool 
that aids in decision making. TOPSIS incorporates a 
user-defined decision matrix (with dimensions based 
upon ‘criteria’ and ‘alternatives’) that compares each 
alternative to a preset baseline using a number scale 
from 1 to 9 with 5 being the same, 9 being much 
better, and 1 being much worse. This matrix is 
populated using normalized data from the trade 
studies, costing analysis and reliability calculations, 
and qualitative engineering assessment where there is 
no hard data. TOPSIS then formulates a “most ideal” 
and “least ideal” solution. The alternatives are then 
ranked by their Euclidean distance from these 
“ideals.”8 Figures Of Merit (FOM) and their relative 
importance that are fed into TOPSIS come from the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP).  As described 
by Saaty9, AHP uses a full factorial user-defined pair 
wise comparison to numerically determine a 
normalized importance for each FOM. 
TOPSIS is not user friendly and a good deal of 
information must be known before the tool can be 
used correctly. TOPSIS does allow there to be 
mathematical explanations for complicated decisions 
that have to be made.  Therefore, TOPSIS allows the 
less experienced user to make a better decision that 
would be on par with someone who has more 
experience in decision-making.   TOPSIS was 
implemented when decisions had to be made that 
involved trade studies.  Calculations were made first 
for Apollo and then for this project.  
 
The tools described above were crucial to the 
development of the CTS. 
1.2 Concept of Operations 
The Apollo spacecraft were used as a point of 
departure for the design resulting in a concept of 
operations similar to that of Apollo. As shown in Fig. 
1, four launches will be required to place a Crew 
Exploration Vehicle (CEV), a Lunar Surface Access 
Module (LSAM), and two Earth Departure Stages 
(EDS), into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) where each 
vehicle will rendezvous with one EDS. The first EDS 
will place the uninhabited LSAM on a translunar 
trajectory approximately 5 days in duration, and the 
second EDS will transport the CEV with crew to Low 
Lunar Orbit (LLO) in about 4 days. A rendezvous 
will occur between the CEV and LSAM, during 
which the crew will transfer after docking. Then, the 
two craft will separate from each other prior to a 
lunar descent performed by the Lunar Decent Module 
(LDM) portion of the LSAM to a landing site in the 
polar region of the moon’s surface.  Once on the 
lunar surface, the crew may stay for up to 70 days. In 
the meantime, the CEV will remain uninhabited in 
low lunar orbit. The two craft will be rejoined after 
the Lunar Ascent Module (LAM) portion of the 
LSAM ascends with the crew from the moon’s 
surface. After a crew transfer, the CEV and LAM are 
to be separated a second time before the CEV 
launches itself into an Earthbound trajectory lasting 
about 4 days. The LAM is then discarded. The CEV 
is composed of the Reentry Module (RM) and 
Propulsion Module (PM).  The RM will separate 
from the PM and protect the crew during direct entry 
into the Earth’s atmosphere and a subsequent ocean 
landing.   
 
 
Figure 1: Operational Architectures Flow Chart 
 
2 Requirements 
NASA requirements given in Ref. [10-16] 
were modified to obtain the requirements used in this 
project. Table I displays how the important 
requirements varied from the original to the final 







Table I: Changes in Requirements 
Requirements CSM CEV   
Crew 3 4   
Diameter 3.9116 4.4958 m 
Total ∆V 1951 2588 m/s 
Propellant Surplus 5% 10%   
Cargo 138 500 kg 
EVA's 0 2   
Uncrewed Days 0 70  days 
Crewed Days 14 11.5  days 
  LEM LSAM   
Crew 2 4   
Crew Days 4 7   Days
Landing ∆V 401 438 /s 0 5 m
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3 Sizing  
In sizing the CTS, two Microsoft Excel 
workbooks were developed that would size the CTS 
as a whole.  The first spreadsheet developed was for 
mass sizing.  From the mass sizing spreadsheet, 
geometry sizing was derived for the corresponding 
masses.  The following sections will detail the 
approach used in sizing with these two spreadsheets. 
3.1 Mass Sizing  
The mass sizing tool related the various 
subsystem and component masses to the inputs that 
would logically affect each of these subsystems and 
components for the original Apollo elements.  For 
example, the mass of the crew couch in the RM is the 
Apollo crew couch mass divided by the number of 
crew on Apollo, 3, and multiplied by the number of 
crew in the new requirements, 4.   
A similar method was used to change the 
number and types of engines, power supply, and 
other technologies for each of the elements.  The tool 
was designed to size the Apollo elements when the 
Apollo requirements and technologies are input.  
Each of the original Apollo element masses came 
from Ref. [16].  The underlying assumption of this 
mass sizing tool is that any architecture designed 
includes a re-entry module attached to a propulsion 
module and a two stage lunar landing module.  The 
EDS was sized using the Space Propulsion Sizing 
Program (SPSP)3 which allows for detailed 
conceptual design of in-space stages. 
The process of designing the elements for 
this architecture began with the Apollo spacecraft and 
lunar module.  One at a time, the new requirements 
were input to get a design point using old 1960’s 
Apollo technology.  The effects of each of the 
requirements on the mass of the CEV can be seen in 
Fig. 2.  The blue bar is the RM and the maroon bar is 
the PM.  A similar effect can be seen in Fig. 3 for the 
LSAM.  The blue bar is the Lunar LAM and the 
maroon bar is the LDM.   
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Figure 3: LSAM Mass Growth with Requirements 
 
The most significant increases on the CEV and 
LSAM masses are the increased crew capacities.  
Adding one additional astronaut to the CEV two to 
the LSAM almost doubles the entire system.  
Additionally, the CEV is greatly affected by 
increasing the ∆V capabilities. 
3.2 Technology 
The next step was to modernize the 
technologies used on the CEV and LSAM.  The 
modernization results required the use of SPSP as 
well as the mass sizing tool. Figures 4 and 5 show the 
decrease in mass as each of the new technologies is 
applied to the CEV and LSAM, respectively. 
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Figure 5: LSAM Mass Decrease with Technology 
 
The RM is impacted most by advances in 
the Thermal Protection System (TPS) technology, see 
Table II.  Due to the interconnectivity of the RM and 
PM, mass savings on the RM cause additional 
savings on the PM.  The PM also has significant mass 
reductions when using a higher performance rocket 
engine, see Table II.  The LAM and LDM have 
substantial mass savings after switching to better 
engines.  The LDM also has a large reduction when 
the LAM reduces mass. 
The project baseline, with the new 
requirements and new technologies, is the result of 
this process.  The main features of this baseline are 
the 5.87 meter diameter, the change to a primary 
structure of aluminum for all elements, the hydrazine 
thrusters for the Reaction Control System (RCS) on 
the RM and LAM, the NK-39 liquid oxygen/kerosene 
engine on the PM, the gaseous oxygen/kerosene RCS 
thrusters on the PM, the upgrade to Shuttle Transport 
System fuel cells, the change to Lithium Ion batteries 
on all elements requiring batteries, the use of an 
inflatable airlock for Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) 
on the RM, the use of the RD-8 Nitrogen 
tetroxide/Unsymmetric dimethalhydrazine engine on 
the LAM and LDM, and modern avionics equipment.  
Table II outlines the technology changes from the 
1960’s/Apollo to 2005/final revision. 
 
Table II: Technology for 1960’s vs. 2005 
Technology Apollo Baseline 












Steel Al-Li 3.64% 
RM Power Silver-Zinc Li-Ion 0.34% 
RM 
Avionics 1960's 2005 0.29% 
RM RCS 
Storable Bi-
Prop Mono-Propellant -2.48% 
  Isp = 290 Isp = 235   
PM Main 
Engine Storable Cryogenic 20.37% 
  Isp = 314 Isp = 362   
PM RCS 
storable bi-
prop Cryogenic Bi-Prop 3.96% 
  Isp = 290 Isp = 265   
PM Power 
1960's fuel 




Honeycomb Al-Li Honeycomb 1.72% 
PM 
Avionics 1960's 2005 0.39% 
LAM Main 
Engine Storable Modern Storable 8.06% 
  Isp = 311 Isp = 342   
LAM 
Power Silver-Zinc Li-Ion 2.88% 
LAM 
Structure Aluminum Al-Li 2.33% 
LAM 
Avionics 1960's 2005 0.59% 
LAM RCS 
Storable Bi-
Prop Mono-Propellant -1.54% 
  Isp = 290 Isp = 235   
LDM Main 
Engine Storable Modern Storable 7.50% 
  Isp = 311 Isp = 342   
LDM 
Power Silver-Zinc Li-Ion 0.94% 
LDM 
Structure Aluminum Al-Li 0.72% 
LDM 
Avionics 1960's 2005 0.01% 
 
3.3 Architecture Change 
To accommodate the volume per crew 
member, as explained in the following geometry 
section, the diameter was increased, which later the 
previously generated Solid Edge model.  The 
structure was changed to a lower density material for 
the majority of each element, but the RM heat shield 
substructure was left as stainless steel for TPS 
bonding requirements.  The change supported by 
SPSP to hydrazine thrusters allowed for a simpler 
system of tanks, although there is a penalty in 
performance.  The change to the NK-39 engine was 
to increase the Specific Impulse (Isp) while avoiding 
the problems of liquid hydrogen boil-off; the RCS 
thruster was changed on the PM to utilize the oxygen 
from lost boil-off.  Each of the power supply systems 
were updated to more advanced components.  The 
addition of the inflatable airlock decreases the 
oxygen lost during depressurization to achieve the 
minimum requirement of two emergency EVA’s.  
For reliability concerns, the LAM and LDM engines 
needed to be high performance and reliable; the most 
reliable propellants are hypergolic, and the RD-8 has 
the highest Isp of that class.  The avionics were 
updated to modern technology standards; the actual 
masses used were calculated through SESAW. 17  
The EDS’s were designed through SPSP to 
have maximum performance.  The EDS for the 
LSAM, referred to as the LSAM-EDS, was designed 
for Translunar Injection (TLI) and Lunar Orbit 
Insertion (LOI) of the LSAM, as in Fig. 1.  The EDS 
for the CEV was only designed for the TLI because 
the CEV performs its own LOI.  Each EDS is capable 
of an Earth orbit rendezvous since each is launched 
separately.  The CEV EDS with the CEV travels 
separately from the LSAM EDS with the LSAM.  
The EDS with the lesser propellant needs was 
designed to be an off-shoot of the EDS with the 
larger propellant requirement.  As a result, the CEV 
EDS has tanks that are only 75% filled.  The EDS is 
essentially two tanks, four RL-10B-2 engines, and the 
necessary structure, power, avionics, and RCS to 
complete its mission.   
The final revisions to the project baseline 
are based on the geometry, trade studies, and multi-
attribute decision making considerations.  Table III 
captures the gross masses, in kilograms, of each 
element in the evolution of the design process from 
the original Apollo to Apollo technology with new 
requirements to the project baseline to the final 
revision.  For the original Apollo, there was only one 
TLI stage, the S-IVB, and for Apollo with new 












RM 5922 11171 9639 7405 
PM 24721 44272 27248 20116 
LAM 4795 13737 11748 8785 
LDM 11642 27146 21028 12429 
CEV 
EDS 
119900 N/A 58765 48614 
LSAM 
EDS 
N/A N/A 75803 52980 
 
3.4 Geometry 
 The CEV and LSAM were initially sized 
according to Apollo with the mass sizing tool and 
Solid Edge.  These components had to share similar 
sizing constraints such as diameter.  From this 
diameter, a link could be established between the PM 
and RM.  This link provided the initial baseline 
development.  From that baseline, the design could 
then be scaled up or down as dictated by the 
requirements.  Two requirements specifically drove 
the sizing of the CEV and LSAM, number of crew 
and habitable volume.  This evolution of the design 
eventually resulted in a 4.5 meter diameter CEV and 
an equally scaled LSAM. 
 From Ref. [16], the geometry of the Apollo 
command module was derived and implemented in a 
computerized scale model.  This geometry was scaled 
to be a sole function of the diameter of the RM.  This 
diameter then dictated the PM diameter.  Reference 
[16] provided propellant masses for the Apollo 
service module allowing for the height of the service 
module to be extracted by sizing the necessary 
propellant tanks.  Apollo used a four tank design, 
having two fuel and oxidizer tanks and two fuel and 
oxidizer sump tanks.  The four tanks were placed 
radially in four of six sectors in the service module.  
The other two sectors were reserved for such 
components as the RCS fuel tanks and the fuel cells.  
One pressurant tank was placed directly in the center 
of the service module.  Engine size was taken directly 
from the actual dimensions of the engine used.  The 
Apollo Lunar Excursion Module sizing was 
accomplished by using a scaling model provided by 
Jerry Woodfill from the NASA Johnson Space 
Center.19  This scale model allowed for visual 
manipulation and design of the upcoming revisions. 
 The baseline was derived from Ref. [10], 
stating the requirement that, “the CEV shall provide 
the capability to conduct missions with 1, 2, 3, and 4 
crew members onboard.”  A four crew member CEV 
had to be designed, thus increasing the radius from 
3.91 meters to 5.87 meters.  The 5.87 meters was 
referenced from a study performed by Orbital 
Sciences Corporation.20  Using three primary design 
points, the 5.87 meter diameter, crew size, and 
mission duration requirement, the masses of the 
corresponding propellant, pressurant, and RCS 
consumables were scaled according to Apollo and the 
accompanying requirements.  Tank sizes were then 
calculated for a variety of different tank 
configurations (toroidal, four tank, and two tank).  
The four tank design was selected for center of 
gravity and packaging space considerations.  After a 
tank model was established, new technology was 
added to the design reducing propellant mass and 
tank size.  Reduced tank size allowed for changes in 
the PM height giving a 2.79 meter height for the 
baseline of the CEV.  The LSAM was scaled 
appropriately to the new masses with no direct 
changes to the design. 
 The final revision was derived from Ref. 
[10] requirements that, “the CEV shall provide a 
minimum habitable volume of 3.0 cubic meters per 
crew member,” and “the CEV shall accommodate 1.5 
cubic meters of payload.”  A model for the RM 
pressure vessel was then developed through the SPSP 
tool.  The vessel was then loaded with components 
that matched the estimated stipulation of volume 
required for a four person crew, as discussed in Ref. 
[20].  The pressure vessel model was then linked to 
the RM sizing model so that the diameter could be 
changed until the habitable volume met the 
requirement of 13.5 cubic meters.  Once this was 
accomplished, the necessary tank sizing was done 
using the tank sizing model.  This yielded a PM 
height of 2.71 meters.  The evolution from the 
original Apollo Command and Service Module 
(CSM) to the final CEV can be seen below.     
 
Figure 6: CEV Evolution 
The LSAM mass was then recalculated with the mass 
sizing tool to incorporate the new engine technology 
of using liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen instead of 
kerosene and liquid oxygen.  This new propellant 
required a much larger volume due to the lower 
density of liquid hydrogen.  To have the LSAM 
remain near the same diameter as the CEV, a new 
tank design had to be incorporated in the LSAM.  
Toroidal tanks were then designed for the LSAM 
because they allow for the largest propellant volume 
available.  Geometry of the LSAM was then adapted 
to fit these new tanks appropriately.  The final 
dimensions of the LSAM are 4.51 meters wide and 
6.56 meters high excluding the landing legs.   
 Sizing has thus been completed for the CEV 
and LSAM.  All requirements have been met for this 
design.  Also, the current size of this design has been 
compared to current launch system payload fairings 
and has been found to fit current day launch systems. 
 
4 Trade Studies 
After performing analysis on the baseline, trade 
studies were conducted, though SPSP and the mass 
sizing tool, in key areas to improve the baseline. The 
results of these studies were analyzed through Multi-
Attribute Decision Making.  The final revision 
incorporates these results and is detailed in the 
Summary section. 
4.1 Engines  
 
Using the baseline mass sizing tool and SPSP, 
the PM main engine Isp was varied over a range of 
300 to 1000 seconds, while holding the engine thrust-
to-weight ratio (T/W) constant at 32.5 and also 65.  
This operation yielded the following graph of CEV 





















Figure 7: CEV Gross Mass vs.  Isp
The curve that resulted was an exponential 
line as expected due to the use of Isp in the Rocket 
Equation.  The two T/W curves overlap, which 
demonstrates that the gross mass is not heavily 
controlled by the T/W ratio.  This result is further 
proven in Fig. 8, which was made by varying T/W 























Figure 8: CEV Gross Mass vs. T/W 
 
Changes in engine T/W ratios above 20 have 
negligible effects; whereas, increases in the Isp 
reduced mass for all T/W ratios.  From these two 
trades, it is obvious that to minimize gross mass the 
highest possible Isp should be used with a T/W of at 
least 20.  These two trades were also conducted for 
the LAM and LDM engines with the same results; it 
was assumed throughout the trade that the LAM and 
LDM stages used identical engines.  Since nuclear 
thermal rockets may not be flight ready in time, a 
liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen engine in the RL-10 
family satisfied the performance criteria outlined in 
this study.  The RL-10B-2 was the best choice 
because of its high Isp of 462 seconds and T/W of 
51.2.  This also simplified the design by using of the 
same engines on multiple elements in the mission. 
4.2 Time of Flight 
 The proposed architecture incorporates three 
notable transfers. First, the LSAM is delivered to 
LLO where it awaits the crew.  The CEV is then 
delivered to LLO to rendezvous with the LSAM, and 
finally the crew must return to Earth.  By using SPSP 
and the mass sizing tool, it was seen that these three 
Times of Flight (TOF) affect both of the EDSs as 
well as the PM size.  As described earlier these stages 
perform slightly different tasks and carry different 
payloads.  Therefore, by varying the TOF, there was 
a possibility of evening out the propellant mass 
required for each EDS.   
 The first case that was examined was the 
final TOF in which the PM would perform the TEI in 
order to return the crew to the Earth.  Reducing the 
TOF reduces the required impulse at injection.  This 
decreases the ∆V requirements on the EDS and PM, 
exponentially decreasing the mass of the stage 
through the rocket equation.  However, increasing the 
TOF also increases the crew supplies and 
Environmental Control and Life Support System 
(ECLSS) requirements.  All of this was taken into 
account in the mass sizing spread sheet described 
above.  The sizing model could not take into account 
the psychological and physiological effects that 
longer TOFs could have on the astronauts.  Although 
the habitable volume requirement is larger than that 
of Apollo, it is still a small space to be confined for 
extended periods of time.  One solution to this 
problem would be making habitable volume a 
function of TOF.  This option was not considered 
because habitable volume was specifically listed as a 
requirement and as shown in Fig. 9 the relationship 
quickly levels off at 4 days.  
In fact, though it is hard to see in the plot, 
after 4 days, the mass slowly begins to increase due 
to the extra crew commodities and ECLSS 
requirements.  From inspection of the plot it can be 
seen that there is a great mass benefit in a TOF of 
greater than 3 days with diminishing returns for a 
TOF of greater than 4 days.  The point located at 3.75 
days represents a lunarbound TOF of 4 days for 
which the PM is responsible for the LOI and a 3.5 
day earthbound TOF for which the PM performs the 
TEI.  As shown these cross points fit the general 
trend for half day differences.  Differences of greater 
than a half day were ruled out due to the sharp knee 
of the plot and the short area of interest (3 to 4 days).  
As a result of this analysis, combined with 
engineering judgment to account for psychological 
and physiological effects it was recommend that 
since the habitable volume was larger than that of 
Apollo and the Apollo astronauts did not show signs 
that an extra half day of travel would have profound 
negative effects, it was determined feasible to extend 
both the TLI and TEI to 4 day TOFs.  This data and 
recommendation was then passed on to  the Multi-
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Figure 9: PM Mass as a Function of TOF 
 
Using the Space Propulsion Sizing Program 
(SPSP) 3 for EDS mass sizing, the ∆Vs were varied 
according to the range of TOF.  As seen in the Fig. 
10, increases in the TOF have substantial mass 
savings on the EDS gross mass.  The method by 
which to design the CEV EDS was also evaluated in 
this study.  The first option considered was a CEV 
EDS identical in every way to the LSAM EDS except 
with tanks that are not completely full.  The other 
option was a CEV EDS that is completely 
independent so that the tanks were re-sized for the 
smaller propellant load.  The close proximity of the 
two curves, varying by about 2 metric tonnes at the 
longer TOF, and the consideration of the cost of two 
completely separate EDSs shows that there is not a 
substantial advantage to designing two completely 
different vehicles. 
For the TOF considerations, it appears that 
extending the LSAM EDS TOF to the full 5 days is 
the best choice, particularly since it is not crewed 
when en route to the moon.  However, the CEV EDS 
must take into account the increase in required 
























Figure 10: EDS Gross Mass vs. TOF 
 
4.3 Number of EDSs 
Using SPSP3 and the mass sizing tool, the 
gross mass of the EDSs for 1, 2, 3, and 4 stages for 
the CEV and LSAM stacks was calculated.  The 
primary assumption was that the same EDS would be 
used for each stage in the LSAM stack and for the 
CEV stack.  However, for the CEV stack, the EDS 
will not have full propellant loads due to a decrease 
in the ∆V requirement of the stack.  Figure 11 shows 
that there is a substantial decrease in gross mass with 
increases in the number of stages. However, increases 
in the number of stages logically increase the number 
of launches.  Therefore, a desired effect may be to 
have a lower gross mass in order to fit the EDS on a 
particular launch vehicle but at the cost of more 
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Figure 11: EDS Gross Mass vs. Number of EDSs 
 
4.4 Power  
The power analysis was performed using the 
power module of SPSP. 3  A primary source, which 
required 7 kilowatts, was selected and a secondary 
source was added to that, which required 1 kilowatt. 
Various combinations between the following power 
sources were considered: Gallium Arsenide solar 
arrays, Silicon solar arrays, Nickel-Cadmium 
batteries, Nickel-Hydrogen batteries, Lithium-Ion 
batteries, Silicon-Zinc batteries, Mercury-Oxide 
batteries, RTGs, and Shuttle Transportation System 
grade fuel cells.  The driving factor for this design 
comparison was mass.  Based upon this driver, the 
Gallium-Arsenide body mounted solar arrays and 
Lithium-Ion battery combination was the best, which 
resulted in a total mass for the PM and LSAM power 
systems of 133 kilograms.  The second best 
combination was the body-mounted Gallium-
Arsenide solar arrays and fuel cells option.  The third 
most desirable option was the fuel cells and Lithium 
battery option.  These three combinations were 
considered in further analysis because the fuel cells, 
though heavier, have the capability to provide 
drinkable water for the crew, whereas the solar arrays 
do not, and the water has to be stowed and carried 
throughout the mission.  
 The water need for the crew per day is 
approximately 12 kilograms.  The crew is going to be 
on the PM for 8 days and the LSAM for 7 days, 
meaning the total water needed is approximately 96 
kilograms and 84 kilograms, respectively.  
Regardless of the power system, 25 kilograms of 
water will be carried at launch, which drops the PM 
water requirement down to 71 kilograms.  When the 
water tanks and the total water requirements were 
added into the equation for total mass, the Gallium-
Arsenide solar array- Lithium-Ion battery option still 
produced the lowest mass. 
 The power considerations for the RM were 
calculated differently, mainly because the RM will 
draw power from the PM until around 3.5 hours 
before landing.  During this short time for re-entry, 
the RM will rely on three Lithium-Ion batteries. 
 
4.5 Number of Crew  
 Although the crew size was set by the 
requirements, the effects of changing crew size was 
analyzed as a check on the requirements and to 
determine if a requirement change should be 
suggested.  Again, the mass sizing tool was used to 
calculate the CEV and the LSAM masses for varying 
crew size.  As shown in Fig.  12, the CEV grows in a 
quadratic fashion while the LSAM shows a linear 
relationship.  With the required crew size of 4, it is 
shown that the LSAM is slightly smaller than the 
CEV. This is ideal for the architecture and sizing the 
two EDSs.  Varying to either 3 or 5 crew would make 
using the same EDS for both systems impractical. 
With the extended lunar duration listed in the 
requirements, having a crew larger than Apollo 
makes sense in order to allow more specialties to be 
represented; however, evaluating the benefit gained 
by adding crew is beyond the scope of this study and 
























Figure 12: CEV Mass as a Function of Crew Size 
 
5 Trajectory 
 Aerodynamic Preliminary Analysis System 
(APAS)4 was used to determine the primary 
aerodynamic coefficients of the RM design.  These 
include the coefficients of lift, drag, and pitching 
moment, which were used in a simulation of the 
RM’s re-entry trajectory into the Earth’s atmosphere 
developed in the Program to Optimize Simulated 
Trajectories (POST).5  Various assumptions were 
implemented in the run of APAS, which will be 
discussed in further detail below. 
 For the purposes of this design, only a 
hypersonic analysis of the RM was required because 
pinpoint targeting was not necessary to assess heat 
rate and heat load for heat shield sizing.  This is 
because heat shield size is the most important factor 
for the design as it comprises almost 30% of the 
RM’s total mass.  Thus, APAS was only used to run 
Mach numbers greater than 4, neglecting all 
aerodynamics in the supersonic regime and below, 
which are important for stability and precision 
landing. 
The geometry input into APAS was taken 
directly from the scaled version of Apollo.  For 
stability and trim, the RM’s c.g. location was scaled 
from the original Apollo Command Module (CM) 
c.g. location. This was due to the assumption that the 
packaging of the RM for this preliminary design was 
imperfect.  Thus, the scaled Apollo c.g. location 
provided a useable estimate that would simulate real 
world uncertainty.  The module was then analyzed 
for an angle of attack sweep of 110 to 180 degrees 
measured from the body axis rotated clockwise with 
the top facing forward. 
APAS was initially run for the Apollo CM 
geometry.  From  Ref. [18], wind tunnel data for the 
coefficients of lift, drag, and pitching moment were 
retrieved and compared to the results given by APAS.  
The results showed that the use of Modified 
Newtonian Flow Theory by APAS consistently 
calculated higher lift and drag coefficient curves than 
those given by the wind tunnel data.  In order to 
calibrate APAS for application to the new RM 
design, correction coefficients were introduced for 
both lift and drag to shift the coefficient curves to 
match NASA’s wind tunnel data.  These correction 
coefficients were 0.93 and 0.94 for the lift and drag 
coefficients, respectively.  An example of this 
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Figure 13:  Calibration of APAS Lift Coefficient 
Curve. 
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Figure 14:  Calibrated APAS Lift Coefficient Plotted 
Against NASA Wind Tunnel Data. 
 
APAS was then used to calculate aerodynamic 
coefficients for the 5.87 meter and 4.50 meter 
diameter designs of the new RM.  
 With the APAS database complete, all 
parameters necessary to run the POST simulations 
were ready for input.  In order to provide a valid 
comparison, a nominal trajectory of the Apollo CM 
re-entry was first needed.  To create a simulation that 
would model the CM’s trajectory as closely as 
possible, all atmospheric interface conditions as well 
as the bank angle profile were taken from 
reconstructed flight data of the Apollo 4 CM,15 which 
simulated lunar return conditions.  In addition, a 
generalized acceleration steering algorithm was used 
within the POST model to control the angle of attack 
so that the pitching moment would be equal to zero, 
causing the CM to fly at trim throughout the 
trajectory.  The resulting simulation may be seen in 
Fig. 15 and is plotted against the actual Apollo 4 
flight data. 
Geodetic Altitude (ft) Geodetic Latitude (deg) Longitude (deg)
 
Figure 15:  POST Simulated Trajectory of Apollo 
CM. 
 
 With the model complete and validated, the 
simulation was rerun for the 5.87 meter and 4.50 
meter diameter design revisions of the new RM.  The 
input was adjusted to account for the changes in 
vehicle geometry and aerodynamics, but all other 
parameters remained the same.  The resulting 
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Figure 16:  POST Trajectories for Apollo CM and 
5.87 meter and 4.50 meter RM Designs. 
 
Using these simulated trajectories, 
maximum deceleration, maximum heat rate, and total 
heat load were compared.  In reference to the heat 
rates and heat loads calculated by POST, it should be 
noted that these calculations are based on Chapman’s 
equations14 for stagnation point convective heating 
and do not account for any radiant heating.  For these 






Table IV: Key Parameters from POST Simulations 











6.9151 2.111× 106 2.441× 108
Baseline 
RM 
7.5105 1.513× 106 1.809× 108
Final 
Rev. RM 
7.0140 1.925× 106 2.251× 108
 
Based on this trajectory analysis, the final 
revision of the RM design has been shown to re-enter 
the Earth’s atmosphere at nearly the same conditions 
as the Apollo CM with only a slight increase in 
maximum deceleration and reductions in both heat 
rate and heat load.  This RM design was also tested 
for its maximum and minimum downrange 
capability.  The minimum downrange was restricted 
by a limit of 20 g’s, while the maximum downrange 
was calculated with bank angle set to zero.  The 
results showed this RM design to have a minimum 
downrange capability of 1192.3 km and a maximum 
downrange of 36861 km. 
6 Reliability 
Using the Excel-based program Quantitative 
Risk Assessment System: Shuttle Database22 for 
Space Shuttle vintage subsystems, the reliability of 
39 components, systems, and maneuvers can be 
determined.  Some of the components are batteries, 
fuel cells, tanks, and displays.  Some of the systems 
described are the propulsion system, electrical 
system, and communications.  The maneuvers 
covered are rendezvous, docking, and separation.  By 
selecting the applicable components, determining 
whether reliability is based on cumulative hours or 
cycles, and indicating the level of redundancy, the 
program provides the module’s reliability.  The 
product of all of the module reliabilities in the 
mission yields the system reliability.  This output is 
the probability of any failure of the system, and it 
does not make any assumptions about critical 
failures.   
Using this method, Apollo’s reliability was 
calculated to be 92.5% for the Apollo CSM, LEM 
and Saturn Upper Stage, S-IVB, which did the TLI 
maneuver.  The Lunar Ascent Module was the 
element with the lowest reliability at 97.2%, 
primarily as a result of the rendezvous and docking 
maneuver with the CSM after lunar ascent.  In a close 
second at 97.9%, the Apollo Service Module had the 
next lowest reliability; this is also due to the 
rendezvous and docking maneuvers it had to 
complete.   
This same method yielded 88.6% for the design 
baseline, which consisted of the CEV, LSAM, and 2 
EDSs.  At 96.8%, the PM was also the least reliable 
element of the project baseline; this was again due to 
rendezvous and docking.  The LAM was affected by 
these maneuvers as the source of low reliability. 
For the same number and type of elements, the 
final revision had slightly lower reliability, of 87.8%, 
as compared to baseline; although for that miniscule 
decrease in reliability of 0.8%, the final revision 
obtained a substantial gain in system performance.  It 
would seem a common trend that the LAM and PM 
were again the least reliable at 97.1% and 97.6%, 
respectively. These reliability estimates demonstrated 
that increased numbers of rendezvous and docking 
maneuvers enhance the risks of the mission. 
Though the reliability calculations did not 
include any assumptions about the launch vehicle, it 
is necessary to require that the launch vehicle have a 
high reliability.  To maintain a total mission 
reliability of at least 85%, the reliability of the launch 
vehicles for the baseline through the final revision 
must be 99%.  The launcher reliability decreases to 
97.5%, if only 80% mission reliability is acceptable.  
For most launch vehicles, particularly a human-rated 
vehicle, achieving 97% or more reliability is possible.  
Table V shows the impact of launch vehicle 
reliability assumptions on total mission success.  
Note that the single Apollo launch vehicle approach 
provides the highest probability of mission success. 
 
Table V: Total Reliability for Various Launchers 
 Apollo Baseline Final 
In Space 
Reliability 
0.925 0.886 0.878 
Launchers 
Reliability 
0.99 0.99 0.99 
Total 0.92 0.85 0.84 
Launchers 
Reliability 
0.98 0.98 0.98 
Total 0.91 0.82 0.81 
Launchers 
Reliability 
0.96 0.96 0.96 
Total 0.89 0.75 0.75 
7 Cost 
The costing for the CEV, LSAM, and EDS 
was performed using the NASA/Air Force Costing 
Model.7 In addition to mass and technology 
development, fees, salaries, and other financial 
considerations may also be taken into account in this 
tool. 
With mass as the primary driver, the costing 
model provided for a cost comparison between the 
baseline and final version.  Both of these versions 
were compared to Apollo costs for the same number 
of missions. Figure 17 displays the comparison 










Apollo $54.4B Baseline $47.4B Final Rev $41.7B  
Figure 17: Costing Comparison for CEV 
 
As shown in the figure above, there are 
drastic differences between Apollo and the final 
version, even with the extra person that the baseline 
and final revision included. The Apollo mission, 
including Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
(DDT&E) as well as 30 flights (design phases A 
through E), was priced at a total of $54.4 billion.  The 
baseline produced a lower value of $47.4 billion and 
the final version dropped to a value of $41.7 billion 
(all dollar amounts are in 2001 US dollars).  
The EDS costs were also evaluated. For this 
project, there were two EDSs taken into account per 
mission, both were considered and priced as the same 
amount.  The value for the baseline was found to be 
$10 billion, while the final version was found to cost 
$9.9 billion.  Figure 18 shows the increase in cost for 













Apollo $19.9B Baseline $10.0B Final Rev. $9.9B  
Figure 18: Costing Comparison for EDS 
 
The cost of the LSAM was also obtained 
through NAFCOM. The baseline price was $32.9 
billion, and the final version was found to be $26.2 
billion.  Figure 19 shows the increase in cost for the 









Apollo $32.9B Baseline $31.0B Final Rev. $26.2B  
Figure 19: Costing Comparison for LSAM 
 
Another cost consideration was the launch 
vehicle.  The architecture requires 4 launches based 
on the estimated launcher capability, for either 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) or 
Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle (SDLV).  An EELV 
cost is approximately $200 million per launch; 
whereas, the SDLV has no reported launch cost.  For 
this mission, 4 launches are needed, which would 
cost approximately $800 million. The costs are 
significantly lower than the approximate $1.25 billion 
per launch cost of the Saturn V.  This Saturn V 
launch cost is without the S-IVB and assumes 30 
flights and an 80% learning curve. 
8 Multi-Attribute Decision 
Making 
With the trade studies completed, the 
optimum combination of trades was determined using 
the multi-attribute decision making tool called 
TOPSIS.  This process ensured that the architecture 
as a whole would be optimized but not necessarily 
each discipline.  In order to do this, a list of Figures 
of Merit (FOM) was created that looked at each 
discipline as well as the entire architecture.  The list 
was scrutinized, parsed, and rearranged to ensure that 
each remaining FOM was independent of all the 
others.  These FOMs were again parsed into a final 
list of discriminators, throwing out any FOMs that 
would be too similar over the combination of trades 
that were considered.  This resulted in the six 
discriminating FOMs in Table VI: Reliability, 
DDT&E Cost, Production Cost, Flexibility, 
Extensibility, and Development Risk.  
 
Table VI: Figures of Merit Descriptions 
Production Cost Cost of manufacturing all required element over the lifecycle of the program.
Reliability Probability of a hardware failure, critical or otherwise.
Extensibility
Applicability and extensibility of technologies, 
systems, and operations of a lunar mission 




Applicability and extensibility of technologies, 
systems, and operations of a lunar mission 
architecture to other potential exploration 
missions/destinations.  
DDT&E Cost Cost to design, develop, test, and evaluate all architecture systems to IOC.
Flexibility Ability of an architecture to increase capabilities to meet evolving mission requirements.
 
The relative importance of these discriminators 
was calculated using the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP).  In the process, AHP calculates a 
consistency ratio, which is used to ensure that the 
comparisons are consistent with each other, to 
eliminate bias, and ensure there were no errors when 
filling out the inputs.  The resulting weightings were 
then fed into TOPSIS (which is described above) to 
find the optimum combination of trades based on our 
FOMs. To ensure a fair calculation, two trials were 
run.  The first used Apollo as the datum point to 
which all other alternatives were compared, with the 
second run using the top ranked alternative from the 
first trial as the datum point. 
 Both trials gave the same top solution with 
only one variation between two close rated solutions. 
With this verification, the optimum combination of 
trades, as judged by the FOMs, included a liquid 
oxygen/kerosene propulsion system for the PM with 
a four day TOF for both the lunar-bound and earth-
bound transfers.  The LSAM used a liquid 
oxygen/liquid hydrogen propulsion system and had a 
lunar-bound TOF of 5 days.  Both systems would 
rely on body-mounted Gallium-Arsenide solar arrays 
as a primary power source with Li-Ion batteries as a 
secondary source.  The TOPSIS results for the final 
















Figure 20: Spider Plot of TOPSIS Results 
9 Summary  
The final revision of the CTS was created 
through the use of various aerospace engineering 
tools and simplifying assumptions. This final revision 
was a product of trade study results and multi-
attribute decision making completed in the areas 
believed to have significant impact on the design.  
These results were based primarily on the tools which 
produced the figures showing mass decrease with 
technology changes.  The main changes in the final 
revision are the main engines (from SPSP) on the 
LAM and LDM, power sources (from SPSP) in the 
PM and LSAM, ∆V requirements and TOF, and CEV 
diameter (from the mass sizing tool).  The RL-10B-2 
engine was applied to both stages of the LSAM for 
increased performance.  The PM and LSAM power 
systems changed (through SPSP) to a combination of 
solar arrays and Li-ion batteries.  The TOF was 
increased (from historical data) for the LSAM and 
CEV to decrease   ∆V requirements.  The CEV 
diameter was decreased (through the mass sizing 
tool) due to the substantial excess of habitable 
volume in the RM.  However, due to packaging 
constraints noted from Solid Edge models, the PM 
had to revert to the liquid oxygen/kerosene engine 
since liquid hydrogen occupies a substantial volume.   
As has been noted throughout this project, 
aerospace engineering tools were key to developing a 
quick, top level design of a human lunar architecture 
system.  
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